Abstract-In this paper, some new results are presented on the selective discrete Fourier spectra attack introduced first as the Rønjom-Helleseth attack and the modifications due to Rønjom, Gong, and Helleseth. The first part of this paper fills some gaps in the theory of analysis in terms of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). The second part introduces the new fast selective DFT attacks, which are closely related to the fast algebraic attacks in the literature. However, in contrast to the classical view that successful algebraic cryptanalysis of LFSR-based stream cipher depends on the degree of certain annihilators, the analysis in terms of the DFT spectral properties of the sequences generated by these functions is far more refined. It is shown that the selective DFT attack is more efficient than known methods for the case when the number of observed consecutive bits of a filter generator is less than the linear complexity of the sequence. Thus, by utilizing the natural representation imposed by the underlying LFSRs, in certain cases, the analysis in terms of DFT spectra is more efficient and has more flexibility than classical and fast algebraic attacks. Consequently, the new attack imposes a new criterion for the design of cryptographic strong Boolean functions, which is defined as the spectral immunity of a sequence or a Boolean function.
I. INTRODUCTION

L
INEAR feedback shift register (LFSR) sequences are widely used as basic functional blocks in key stream generators in stream cipher models due to their fast implementation. Examples include filter generators, combinatorial generators, clock-controlled generators, and shrinking generators. The classical treatment can be found in [26] . In practice, E0 [7] and the submissions in eSTREAM Project [11] are such examples. For an LFSR based stream cipher, the initial states of the LFSRs serve as a cryptographic key in each communication session. The goal of an attack is to recover the key from some known bits of the keystream. There are many proposed attacks on LFSR based stream ciphers in the literature. However, in this paper, we will primarily restrict ourselves to the recently proposed algebraic attacks [1] , [10] , fast algebraic attacks, and their improvements or variants [2] , [3] , [12] . These attacks usually contain three steps: (a) precomputation, (b) substitution for establishing a system of low-degree equations over or from known keystream bits, and (c) solving the system. In 2003, Courtois [9] proposed the fast algebraic attack (FAA) on stream ciphers to accelerate the algebraic attack by identifying linear relations among the key stream bits. Compared with solving a system of equations directly by linearization and Gaussian elimination, the fast algebraic attack reduces the solving complexity by decreasing the total degree of the equation system, thus reducing the number of monomials in the system and the required number of keystream bits. The efficiency of the precomputation and substitution in the fast algebraic attack is improved by Hawkes and Rose [12] for filter generators and Armknecht [2] for combinatorial generators with or without memory, respectively. Along this line, Armknecht and Ars [3] introduced a variant of the FAA which reduced the number of required consecutive bits of the key stream, but leaves the number of unknowns unchanged. More recently, Rønjom and Helleseth [22] introduced the linear subspace attack, to recover the initial state of a filter generator. The attacker solves a linear system of equations in ( typically 128 or 256) unknowns over after applying a function on bits of the keystream, where the total complexity of the attack is given by , where is the number of monomials in the system. The attack is by far more efficient than the original algebraic attack and fast algebraic attack, but needs more keystream when compared to fast algebraic attack. Shortly after that, Rønjom, Gong, and Helleseth generalized the linear subspace attack by forming a system of linear equations over instead [24] , thus introducing more freedom in the attack which allows to cover some special cases where the original attack does not work directly.
In this paper we introduce fast selective discrete Fourier transform (DFT) attacks, which analogously to FAA-attacks seek to reduce the number of unknowns in the resulting equation system. However, when interpreted in terms of the DFT of the keystream sequence we show that the resulting attack is more efficient than the standard FAA-algebraic attack. Furthermore, it works for the case when the known attacks fail, when Boolean functions employed in filter generators are well-designed for meeting cryptographic requirements. This also imposes a new criterion for the design of key stream generators. As an analogue to the algebraic immunity of a Boolean function, the new criterion is referred to as the spectral immunity of a sequence or a Boolean function. In general speaking, algebraic attacks can be considered as attacks in the time domain, while (fast) selective DFT attacks are the attacks launched in the DFT frequency domain, similarly as in the encoding and decoding in the frequency domain [6] . The remarkable phenomenon is that with such an attack launched in the frequency domain, the number of unknowns in the system of linear equations is invariant under the decimation of the polynomial form of the filter function (Any Boolean function in variables can be viewed as a polynomial function from to which is called the polynomial form of this Boolean function [15] ). However, in the algebraic attacks or fast algebraic attacks, this number is changed at different time instances. We will discuss this phenomenon in details in Section V.
The filter generator consists of a linear feedback shift register(LFSR) and a nonlinear Boolean function that generates a keystream from fixed positions in the LFSR. The recent Rønjom-Helleseth attack and the modifications by Rønjom, Gong, and Helleseth consider and recover the secret key from the keystream and the polynomial where is a known cyclic shift of the keystream. A general drawback with the attack is that it requires as many keybits as the linear complexity of . The second part introduces the new fast selective DFT attacks, which are closely related to the fast algebraic attacks in the literature. In this case fewer keybits are usually required and the attacks are more flexible and refined than in the fast algebraic attack. The main idea is to apply two sequences and such that where . In this case the number of keystream bits, and the number of linear equations, needed in the attack are which is less than . Note that fast algebraic attacks will lead to such relations since the Boolean functions involved give sequences and . A main advantage is that even if the algebraic immunity of is large and thus imply the solutions of many linear equations, the linear complexity can sometimes be much smaller and lead to a more efficient attack. Consequently, the new selective DFT attack introduced here imposes a new criterion for the design of cryptographic strong Boolean functions, which is defined as the spectral immunity of a sequence or a Boolean function. The spectral immunity of is the smallest linear complexity such that or . In this case the attack needs to solve a system of linear equations. A future important problem is to find better algorithms to determine the spectral immunity. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces basic definitions and results which will be used throughout this paper. Determining the DFT of a coordinate scaled sequence is equivalent to recovering the initial states of LFSRs based stream ciphers. In Section III, we introduce the concept of selective DFT filters, and briefly reiterate the original algorithm from [24] for solving this problem given the DFT of the original sequence and consecutive bits of the coordinate scaled sequence for equal to the linear complexity of the sequence. In Section IV we present an algorithm for solving this problem when is less than the linear complexity, referred to as a fast selective DFT attack in order to emphasize its relation to fast algebraic attacks. Section V shows the applications of these algorithms to filter generators, as well as the comparison with the known methods. The new criterion for the design of LFSR based stream ciphers for being resistant to these new attacks, called the spectral immunity of a sequence or a Boolean function, is introduced in Section VI, and some basic properties of spectral immunity are provided in the same section. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) Sequences
A binary sequence is called an LFSR sequence of degree if it satisfies a linear recursion with binary coefficients
The polynomial is called the characteristic polynomial of the sequence. The initial state of the LFSR and the recursion generates . We also say that is generated by . A sequence is an -sequences if it has a primitive characteristic polynomial [14] . Let be the trace mapping from to , then an -sequence can be written where is a primitive element (of order ) in that is a zero of its characteristic polynomial. Each nonzero value of corresponds to a cyclic shift of the -sequence.
B. Minimal Polynomials, Linear Complexities, and the (Left) Shift Operator
The minimal polynomial of is a polynomial with smallest degree which generates . Let be the minimal polynomial of , then for any that generates . The linear complexity (or linear span) of is the degree of , denoted by . In general, can be found using the BerlekampMassey algorithm [4] , [18] from any consecutive bits of . The (Left cyclically) shift operator is defined by , and . If , then we say that they are shift equivalent, and is a shift of . Otherwise, they are shift distinct.
C. Representation of Binary Sequences and the DFT
The case of odd is the situation of interest for any filter generator with an LFSR generating an -sequence. In principle, the case when is even is also straightforward but more complicated, so we do not consider this case here.
A useful fact is that any sequence of period can be uniquely written such that for some polynomial . Determination of is simple using the DFT transform described in the following.
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of is defined by
The inverse DFT is given by
Thus, it holds that where . Note that the sequence is a sequence over , and it is called a DFT spectral sequence of (with respect to ) or DFT spectra for short.
Furthermore, since , the uniqueness of the representation of implies that where indices are calculated modulo . Therefore, can be written in a more compact form as (4) (5) where each is a coset leaders (the smallest element) in its cyclotomic coset , where is the size of , and is the trace function from to . This is referred to as a trace representation of . From now on, we may use for all trace monomial terms in for simplicity, where the exact meaning of , i.e., from which field to , depends on the size of the coset containing . In this paper, we use (3), (4), and (5) interchangeably. Note that in the trace representation of , only the monomial trace terms which correspond to are listed in the summation. Let and . The linear complexity of is equal to the number of nonzero spectra of , i.e., .
D. Conversion Between Solving the System of Linear Equations Over and
Let be a subset of the set of coset leaders modulo , and be the union of cosets with coset leaders in . We consider the following system of equations with unknowns : (6) where
. Using the idea in [16] , for any is a basis of over . Hence, can be written as the form of , where . Hence, (6) can be converted into the following system of equations over with variables (7) where .
Lemma 1:
With the notations as above, if (6) has solutions for , then can be computed by (7), the system of equations over , where .
E. Filter Generator
The (8) Thus, our aim is to find from the relation and knowledge of the coefficients in and using bits from the keystream . In the following, we first show how to solve this problem for by rephrasing the algorithm from [22] , [24] in terms of the DFT, and then present a new algorithm for the case of .
F. Algebraic Attacks and Fast Algebraic Attacks
With the same notations as in Subsection II-E, for algebraic attacks, the goal is to find a Boolean function with low degree such that or [10] . Hence, or . If we get enough bits of , then we can transfer them into a system of linear equations with unknowns, where . By solving it we could get the key . If is small, then such system of linear equations can be solved efficiently. The smallest is called the algebraic immunity of .
For fast algebraic attacks, the goal is to find Boolean functions with low degree and nonzero such that [9] . Hence, . Let , and . If we get enough consecutive bits of , then we could remove the right side of the equation using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [4] , [18] . Consequently, we obtain a system of linear equations with unknowns. By solving it we could get the key . In this case, we may find and such that is smaller than the algebraic immunity of , and accelerate the algebraic attack.
III. SELECTIVE DFT METHOD FOR
This case is already covered by the authors in [22] , [24] , but we repeat it here for the sake of completeness, and to cover a special case which has not been covered before. The sequence has the same nonzero spectral index set as since is a coordinate scaled sequence of , i.e., , so we use for both sequences. The main idea is to make a linear combination of the keystream and obtain a simple relation between a known and to recover the unknown . This depends on the following simple lemma. The precomputation is to compute in Steps 1 and 2, and in Step 3. The former can be done by adopting the method in [12] for the case of filter generators. The complexity of the precomputation is by Lemmas 4 and 5.
Step 1 of the procedure can be finished with the complexity . The system of the (9) can be solved with the complexity of operations in . One notable characteristic of Algorithm 1 is that the main cost of the computation occurs in the precomputation.
IV. SELECTIVE DFT METHOD FOR
In this section we introduce the fast selective DFT method, which are closely related to fast algebraic attacks. In this case fewer keybits are usually required than in the fast algebraic attack, and the attacks are more flexible. The main idea is to find two sequences and such that where . In this case, the number of keystream bits needed in the method is which is less than , and the number of linear equations is . 
A. Product of Two Sequences
B. Algorithm for
In this subsection, we introduce the fast selective DFT method which is analogous to the fast algebraic attack. From Lemma 3, we have the following algorithm to recover the scale factor when the number of known consecutive bits of is less than . Compute the coefficient matrix of (7) In Algorithm 2, the number of required consecutive bits from is at most . The complexity in Step 1 of the precomputation is contributed from the cost for finding the multiplier sequence which satisfies (11) . If there is no such a sequence, then this method won't work. Thus, we exclude this case. This is a similar case as in the (10) algebraic attack or the fast algebraic attack for finding a multiplier polynomial in which the cost for finding those multipliers is not counted [9] .
The complexity in Step 3 of the precomputation is by Lemmas 4 and 5. The complexity for computing is . By Lemma 5,  can be obtained with the complexity exclusive-or operations. Because is the inner product of and , it can be computed with the complexity of exclusive-or operations. The computation of needs two multiplications of polynomials with degrees at most . Hence, the complexity is . The complexity for all is at most exclusive-or operations in . The system of (12) can be solved with the complexity of operations in .
Remark 1:
In Algorithm 2, we may take . In this case, the number of required consecutive bits from is at most .
Remark 2:
In Algorithm 2, we also can select such that . In this case, we have a system of equations in as for such that . This is a similar case as the algebraic attack, and Algorithm 2 is a similar case as the fast algebraic attack. Those comparisons will be given in details in the next section.
In the following, we demonstrate this method by one example. . Then we have the system of equations given by (13) at the bottom of the page.
From the linearity of the trace function, we have (15) where is given by (14) at the bottom of the page. By evaluation of the trace function, we have
Substituting it to (15) , it follows that
The only solution is which corresponds to . Hence, we find the key which is . To conclude, by the selective DFT method, we need to solve a system of linear equations with only 5 unknowns using 9 keystream bits. However, by the algebraic attack, because the algebraic immunity of is 2, we need to solve a system of linear equations with unknowns using at least 16 keystream bits.
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE SELECTIVE DFT ATTACK TO FILTER GENERATORS
In this section, we show how to apply both algorithms for recovering an initial state of a filter generator and the comparison of the selective DFT attack with the known attacks.
With the same notations as in Subsection II-E, especially is the output sequence of a filter generator, and is a coordinate scaled sequence of . Let represent the number of known consecutive bits of .
A. Case of : Application of Algorithm 1
We assume that satisfies one of the following conditions. (a) There is at least one such that ; or (b) there are indexes such that is co-prime with , where are nonzero integers. By applying Algorithm 1 to , if the condition (a) is true, then we choose . So, Algorithm 1 returns . Thus, the initial state of the LFSR is recovered by . If the condition (a) is not true, but the condition (b) is true, we then select those indexes, and run Algorithm 1 times. Thus, we obtain . Consequently where . So, the initial state of the LFSR is recovered.
Note that the precomputation is only done once for the system. After this, the attacking complexity is the complexity of solving a system of linear equations over in unknowns which is at most provided that consecutive bits of is known for each communication session, where can be taken to be Strassen's reduction exponent . This is the most efficient attack currently known for the case that consecutive bits of are available to an attacker. In the following, we interpret the results presented by Rønjom and Helleseth in 2006 [22] and Rønjom, Gong, and Helleseth in 2007 [24] under the language of the selective DFT method.
(i) In [22] , . So, removes all DFT spectra of except for if it is not zero, i.e., . According to the one-to-one correspondence between sequences and their DFT spectral sequences, may take any value in uniformly. Thus, this attack will fail in some special cases when , which occur with a very small probability.
(ii) In [24] ,
. So, removes all DFT spectra except for for some with and . It will not work if there is no such in . (iii) The new result for a special case: if all spectral indexes in are not co-prime with , but there are indexes such that is coprime with , where are nonzero integers. Thus, the selective DFT attack works.
B. Case of : Application of Algorithm 2
The selective DFT method of Algorithm 2 works if there are and which satisfy the condition (11) . Here, we assume that there exists such sequences and in order to launch this attack. This is a similar case as in the algebraic attack or the fast algebraic attack on filter generators.
Using Algorithm 2, we obtain . Then we recover . Consequently, , the required initial state of the LFSR or the key in the filter generator. It requires at most consecutive bits of to recover the initial state of the LFSR.
C. Comparison of the Selective DFT Attack With Fast Algebraic Attack and Its Variant
We first interpret the fast algebraic attack (FAA) introduced by Courtois in [9] and its variant by Armknecht and Ars in [3] by the language of the selective DFT method. Then we show the comparison of the new method with the FAA/variant. Let . (i) In [9] , , where with , and , and , which results in , i.e., removes all the nonzero spectra of .
(ii) In [3] , . In this case, removes all possible nonzero spectra of which do not belong to the set of possible nonzero spectra of (note that and ). (iii) For , in general, this results in a system of linear equations of unknowns , where . By applying the selective DFT filter to both sides of the identity , the selective DFT filter remove the nonzero spectra of which are not those of . Case (i) removes all nonzero spectra of . This is not necessary as we explained above. Case (ii) considered this problem. In Algorithm 2, we refine this using the DFT spectra of and instead of using , where . (iv) The complexity of both FAA and the variant, not including precomputation, is to solve a system of linear equations over with variables. Algorithm 2 needs to solve a system of linear equations over which can be converted into a system of linear equations over with variables. Note that the precomputation only needs to be done once for the system. Thus, the selective DFT attack is more efficient than the FAA and its variant if . The comparison of the selective DFT attack with the FAA and its variant is shown in Table I at the top of the page in which: -represents the number of the required consecutive bits of ; -represents the number of unknowns in a system of linear equations; -represent solving a system of linear equations over in unknowns; and -
D. Difference Between the Selective DFT Attack and FAA/Variant
(i) The FAA/variant works on a Boolean function domain where the unknowns are monomials of , an initial state of the LFSR which generates . So, one solves a system of linear equations over with variables. On the other hand, the selective DFT attack works on a spectral domain, where the unknowns are and . So, one solves a system of linear equations over which can be converted into a system of linear equations over with variables. Since could be much smaller than , the selective DFT attack could be more efficient than the former.
(ii) The coefficients of monomial terms in with variables are changed for each , but the DFT spectra of are only changed by a scalar multiple of , where corresponds to the desired initial state. (iii) The number of nonzero coefficients of variables (linearized case) in are dynamically changed for each , which is bounded by . Thus, the number of unknowns in the system of linear equations cannot be reduced from . However, the number of nonzero DFT spectral of remains a constant for all the shifts, which is the linear complexity of . (iv) The phenomena (ii) and (iii) are not astonishing, since these are an analogue to the cosine function which is hard to predict the values in real field. However, the Fourier transform of has only two pulses (i.e., two values) which is a simplest case in spectral analysis. (v) Another distinct difference between the FAA/variant and the selective DFT attack is that the filter sequence can be multiplied by any sequence with period ( may not be the least period of ) not just a filter sequence. This opens a much wider window for this type of attacks, which will be addressed in the next subsection.
E. Case of Boolean Functions With High Algebraic Immunity
The algebraic immunity of is defined as the smallest degree such that or [20] , denoted as . The FAA/variant works if there exist some functions and such that and (in the algebraic attack ). From this result, the study for algebraic immunity of Boolean functions is in fashion. If the algebraic immunity of is highest, i.e.,
, then for any such that , if , then . There are two cases as follows. Case 1.
. Then FAA/variant works with the complexity of operations in , where can be taken to be Strassen's reduction exponent . Since , Algorithm 1 is applicable. The latter is a much more efficient attack than the former when . Case 2.
. In this case FAA/variant is not applicable. However, from the selective DFT attack, what matters is the linear complexity . As long as , one can use the selective DFT attack of either Algorithm 1 for or Algorithm 2 for provided that there are such sequences and satisfying (11) . Thus, if the Boolean function has high algebraic immunity, the selective DFT attack is either much more efficient than FAA/ variant or applicable for those cases that FAA/variant fails.
The following is an important remark.
Remark 3:
Under the DFT, the complexity of the sequence is measured by the number of its nonzero DFT spectra, which is the linear complexity of the sequence. This is the reason that the selective DFT attack could work for the case that is high but . A new criterion: The above remark imposes a new criterion for the design of Boolean functions with strong cryptographic properties. In other words, in addition to the existing criteria, a Boolean function employed in a filter generator should satisfy that there are no sequences and with low linear complexity such that (11) holds. This will be formalized in Section VI as spectral immunity in Definition 1. Then is referred to as the spectral immunity of .
Remark 4:
For a Boolean function , we may define its spectral immunity similarly using the one-to-one correspondence between Boolean functions and sequences [15] .
Let be the set consisting of all coset leaders modulo . In the following, we present an algorithm to compute the spectral immunity of a given sequence. This algorithm is adopted from Algorithm 1 in [16] . 
VII. CONCLUSION
Using the selective DFT method, we have presented a new algorithm analogous to the fast algebraic attack that works when the number of keystream bits is less than or equal to the linear complexity of the keystream. As applications of the algorithms, we show how to recover the initial states of LFSRs employed in filter generators when some consecutive bits of the key stream sequence are known. We have compared the methods with the fast algebraic attack by Courtois, and its variant by Armknecht and Ars for filter generators. The comparisons show that the selective DFT attack is more efficient and flexible when is less than or equal to the linear complexity of the sequence and where the employed Boolean functions are well-designed for meeting cryptographic requirements such as having high algebraic immunity. Furthermore, we introduced a new concept named spectral immunity for cryptographic strong functions in order to be resist to the selective DFT attacks.
APPENDIX TWO COMPLEXITY ESTIMATIONS
Let
, and be the minimal polynomial of over . The computation of requires exclusive-or operations for each . There are factors, so the total cost is at most exclusive-or operations. can be computed with the complexity . Thus, for any , the complexity of computing is (16) Lemma 4: With the notations as above, suppose that is given, then 1) the complexity for computing and for all is given by (16); 2) for any , the complexity for computing is also given by (16 can be computed with the complexity of exclusive-or operations; 2) the inner product of (17) can be computed with at most operations when both vectors are given; 3)
can be computed with the complexity of operations. 
